Serge Dupont and Kevin Lynch co-author a policy brief for the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School (JSGS) of Public Policy on moral hazard in the Canadian government's response to the COVID-19 crisis.
They examine three potential manifestations of moral hazard in the emergency policy responses of government to the pandemic—and why containing moral hazard can entail tough choices:
- An expectation that the Government can insure all Canadians against all risks all the time
- The nationalization of private debt through an extension of access to credit to businesses into financial bail-outs
- An expansion of public borrowing at the expense of succeeding generations of Canadians
The policy brief is part of a JSGS series dedicated to exploring and providing evidence-based analysis, policy ideas, recommendations and research conclusions on the various dimensions of the pandemic, as it relates here in Canada and internationally.
Please note that this publication presents an overview of notable legal trends and related updates. It is intended for informational purposes and not as a replacement for detailed legal advice. If you need guidance tailored to your specific circumstances, please contact one of the authors to explore how we can help you navigate your legal needs.
For permission to republish this or any other publication, contact Amrita Kochhar at kochhara@bennettjones.com.